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I.  INTRODUCTION 
My subject is arbitration.  I explore how its re-emergence during the last forty 
years1 has revolutionized the thinking about, and the practice of, law.  The 
development of a “strong federal policy favoring arbitration”2 cast aside traditional 
acceptations about law and adjudication.3  The rule of law—the human civilization 
                                                                
*
 Samuel P. Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 77-189 (2d ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007]; THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 26-46 (2007) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, 
NUTSHELL]; Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for 
Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231 (1990) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Plea for 
Statutory Reform]. 
2E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 (2002).  See also J. Alexander Sec., 
Inc. v. Mendez, 511 U.S. 1150, 1150 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Jacksonville Bulk 
Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n., 457 U.S. 702, 708 (1982); Gateway Coal Co. 
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 377-82 (1974). 
3The pattern of judicial decision-making has shifted from rights protection to guaranteeing 
greater access to some form of adjudication.  As a result, law and adjudication have become 
less sacramental.  See generally THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 49-242 (3d. ed. 2003) [hereinafter CARBONNEAU, CASES 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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associated with law and the legal process—has been profoundly, perhaps 
irretrievably, altered by the rise of arbitration.  The landmark cases in labor and 
employment arbitration—Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company4 (the “old time 
religion”) and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation5  (the “new age” 
thinking)—attest to the enormous distance that separates past and present concepts of 
legal due process and fundamental rights.  Administrative and managerial 
considerations have never weighed more heavily upon basic legal values. Their 
sacramental character has, in fact, been irreversibly tarnished.  Process factors have 
curtailed the reverence for rights.  Practicability has emerged as the dominant force 
in the definition and implementation of law.6  Instrumental beliefs with historical 
                                                          
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION]; CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 57-182. 
4415 U.S. 36 (1974).  See, e.g., T. Christopher Baile, Reconciling Alexander and Gilmer: 
Explaining the Continued Validity of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. in the Context of 
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 219 (1999); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Is 
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. the Death Knell for Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver?, ALI-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education (Dec. 3, 1998); Sarah 
Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 
BYU L. REV. 591 (1997); Lynette T. Oka, Disarray in the Circuits After Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 605 (1987). 
5500 U.S. 20 (1991).  See, e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Introduction: Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: Ten Years After, 16 OHIO. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 463 
(2001); Martin J. Oppenheimer & John F. Fullerton, III, The Role of the Union in the 
Arbitration of Statutory Employment Claims, 55-MAY DISP. RESOL. J. 71 (2000); George 
Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and Implications for 
Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998); Susan A. 
FitzGibbon, Focus on Arbitration After Gilmer: Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. 
& EMP. POL’Y J. 221 (1997); Jennifer A. Marler, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination 
Claims: The Lower Courts Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. to Include 
Individual Employment Contracts, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 443 (1996); Robert Perkovich, Does 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. Compel the Consideration of External Law in Labor 
Arbitration?: An Analysis of the Influence of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Arbitral 
Decisionmaking, 25 STETSON L. REV. 53 (1995); Andrew Kielkopf, Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: An Employee Perspective, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 803 (1993); 
Patrick D. Smith, Arbitration—The Court Opens the Door to Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 17 J. CORP. L. 865 (1992); Jenifer A. 
Magyar, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L. REV. 641 (1992); Edward P. Radetic, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corporation: The Supreme Court Endorses Mandatory Arbitration of ADEA Claims, 35 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 741 (1992); Jennifer R. Dowd, Enforcing Arbitration Agreements in Age 
Discrimination Suits: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 33 B.U. L. REV. 435 (1992); 
Michael G. Holcomb, The Demise of the FAA’s “Contract of Employment” Exception?, 1992 
J. DISP. RESOL. 213 (1992). 
6The purpose of judicial litigation and adjudication is no longer to buttress constitutional 
rights or to engage in rights protection.  Given population growth and resource constriction, 
the purpose of the legal system has become simply to provide a forum for the resolution of 
disputes arising out of various transactions.  See CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 4; 
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 5-9 (2004) [hereinafter 
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2004]. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/3
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foundations7 have virtually disappeared as the legal system countenances exclusively 
the necessity of operational efficacy.  American law and citizenship have undergone 
a drastic transformation as a result of the judicial re-evaluation of arbitration. 
While statistical accounts are not readily available8 or even reliable, arbitration 
has developed significantly in terms both of presence and importance in the last 
several decades.  The AAA (American Arbitration Association) reports, for example, 
that it does in excess of 100,000 Alternate Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) cases 
                                                                
7The Supreme Court has found that substantive and procedural due process can be 
achieved through arbitration.  See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.17 (2007); see also, e.g., Robert W. Abel, The Unanswered 
Question from Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph: How Much is Too Much Before the 
Costs of Arbitration Become a Barrier to Due Process?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1009 (2002); 
Stuart M. Boyarsky, The Confirmation of Punitive Awards in Arbitration: Did Due Process 
Disappear?, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 229 (2006); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class 
Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185 (2006); R. W. Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and 
Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1961); Llewellyn Joseph 
Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the Playing 
Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online Consumer 
Arbitration, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 (2002); Jay E. Grenig, When Due Process is Due: 
The Courts and Labor Arbitration, 1995 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. L. REV. 889 (1995); Elizabeth 
Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the 
Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003); 
Penelope  Hopper, Railroading Essential Rights: The Status of Judicial Review of Alleged Due 
Process Violations in Arbitration Hearings Under the Railway Labor Act, 1995 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 169 (1995); Michael J. Molony, Jr., A-Mazing! A Due Process Protocol for Mediation 
and Arbitration of Employment Law Disputes, 44 LA. B.J. 126 (1996); Karl E. Neudorfer, 
Defining Due Process Down: Punitive Awards and Mandatory Arbitration of Securities 
Disputes, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 207 (1999); Terri Schallenkamp, A Jury Trial is Not 
Required in California State Courts to Meet the Constitutional Guarantee of Due Process 
When the Existence of an Arbitration Agreement Covered by the United States Arbitration Act 
is at Issue: Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Services Corp., 25 PEPP. L. REV. 196 (1997); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for 
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due 
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration as a Tool to 
Unclog Government and the Judiciary: The Due Process Protocol as an International Model, 
7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 10 (1996); Constitutional Law—Due Process—
Compulsory Arbitration, 34 YALE L. J. 909 (1925). 
8These are some of the best studies: NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, ADR PREFERENCE 
AND USAGE REPORT (2006), http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/GPSoloADR 
PreferenceAndUsageReport.pdf; NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, ADR PREFERENCE OF 
USAGE SURVEY, (2006), http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/2006TIPSSurvey.pdf; 
ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING 
CASES (2005), http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/ 
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf; HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ARBITRATION: SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND 
FASTER THAN LITIGATION (2005), http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/Research 
StudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf; ROPERASW, LEGAL DISPUTE STUDY: INSTITUTE FOR 
ADVANCED DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003), http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ 
ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2003Roper Poll.pdf; NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, THE 
CASES FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS, EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND SURVEY RESULTS (2004), http://www. 
adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/Research StudiesAndStatistics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pdf.  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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annually—a significant boost from what had been its traditional workload.9  JAMS 
does business in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.10  Law firms, like 
White & Case and Baker & McKenzie, have international commercial arbitration 
departments.11  Arbitration has become the standard fare in law firms at all levels and 
in most fields. 
It is not a hyperbole to state that civil justice or adjudication in the United States 
(or in international cases) is achieved primarily through arbitration.  Party-appointed 
arbitrators—conducting private proceedings and rendering private awards that may 
or may not contain reasons and may or may not be published or be otherwise 
generally available—establish the standards of fairness and legality in a host of civil 
areas (commercial, employment, securities, and consumer matters).  Arbitration is 
endorsed by most European jurisdictions12 as the common currency of the 
                                                                
9See generally American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org/about (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2008). 
10See generally JAMS—The Resolution Experts, JAMS Announces Milestone Move to 
New York Times Building, http://www.jams-endispute.com/FeatureFull.asp?Feature1ID=101 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (stating that JAMS is “the nation’s largest private provider of 
mediation and arbitration services”). 
11See White & Case LLP, International Arbitration, http://www.whitecase.com/internation 
alarbitration (last visited Mar. 3, 2008); Baker & McKenzie, Dispute Resolution, 
http://www.bakerandmckenzie.com/BakerNet/Practice/DisputeResolution/default.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
12Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jeaggi, AAA HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND ADR (Juris Publishing 2006); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & VRATISLAV 
PECHOTA, IUS ARBITRALE INTERNATIONAL - ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANS SMIT (Juris Publishing 
1992); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
773 (2002); Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 
22 TUL. MAR. L.J. 131 (1997); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Cartesian Logic and Frontier Politics: 
French and American Concepts of Arbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 193 (1994); 
Thomas E. Carbonneau & Andrew W. Sheldrick, Tax Liability and Inarbitrability in 
International Commercial Arbitration, 1 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 23 (1992); THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU & JEAN ROBERT, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRATION (1983).  See also ALBERT JAN 
VAN DEN BERG, YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION SET (2001); see, e.g., Bernard 
Hanotiau, Survey of a New Statute Amending Belgian Legislation on Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 327 (1997); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: 
The Contribution of the French Jurisprudence, 46 LA. L. REV. 1045 (1986); Maud Piers, How 
EU Law Affects Arbitration and the Treatment of Consumer Disputes: The Belgian Example, 
59-JAN DISP. RESOL. J. 76 (2005); Xiaoyang Zhang, Settlement of Commercial Disputes with 
Foreign Elements Involved in Arbitration: Legal Theories and Practice in the United 
Kingdom, 12 FLA. J. INT’L L. 167 (1998); David L. Zicherman, The Use of Pre-Judgment 
Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial Arbitration 
Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British and American Approaches, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 667 (1989); French Arbitration Experts Discuss Proposed Amendments to French Law 
on Arbitration, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 266 (2002); 1998 Act Offers 
Comprehensive Blueprint for Arbitration in the United Kingdom, 7 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REP. 175 (1996). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/3
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international marketplace.  While Asian and the Middle Eastern jurisdictions13 
distrust arbitration—sometimes, to the point of opposition—Latin and South 
American jurisdictions14 have seen an explosion of interest in the process.  Through 
NAFTA15 and ICSID,16 arbitration facilitates the resolution of investment disputes 
                                                                
13See Philip J. McConnaughay, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN ASIA xxv, xxv-xl (Philip J. McConnaughay & Thomas B. Ginsburg eds., 2d 
ed., 2006).     
14See, e.g., NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
(2003); JAN KLEINHEISTERKAMP, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN 
AMERICA (2005); Focus on Arbitration in Latin America, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 
QUARTERLY, (White & Case International Arbitration Group) Fall 2007. 
15NAFTA stands for the North American Free Trade Agreement.  See, e.g., Guillermo 
Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA 
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003); Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 16 ARB. INT’L 393 (2000); Pierre Bienvenue, The 
Enforcement of International Arbitration Agreements and Referral Applications in the NAFTA 
Region, in COMMERCIAL MEDIATION & ARBITRATION IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES 149 (L.M. 
Diaz & N.A. Oretskin eds., 1999); S. Benton Cantey, International Arbitration to Resolve 
Disputes Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 285 (2001); 
Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and Disputes Settlement: Arbitration Under 
NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 409 (2000); Patrick G. Foy, 
Effectiveness of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor-State Arbitration Procedure, 18 ICSID 
REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 44 (2003); Celine Levesque, Investor-State Arbitration 
Under NAFTA Chapter 11: What Lies Beneath Jurisdictional Challenges, 17 ICSID REV.: 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 320 (2002); Daniel Q. Posin, The Multi-Faceted Investment 
Arbitration Rules of NAFTA, 13 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 13 (2002); Symposium, 
Investment, Sovereignty, and Justice: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303 (2000); HANS SMIT & VLADISLAV PECHOTA, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TREATIES (2d ed. 2005); J. C. Thomas, The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in ARBITRATION WORLD: JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISON 93 
(J. William Rowley ed., 2004); NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, 
CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS (Todd Weiler ed., 2004). 
16ICSID stands for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  See, 
e.g., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS (G. Aksen 
& R. von Mehren eds., 1982); C.F. Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 19 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 166 (1979); James C. Baker & 
Lois J. Yoder, ICSID Arbitration and the U.S. Multilateral Corporation: An Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Method in International Business, 5 J. INT’L ARB. 81 (1988); Aron 
Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, 
Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 287 (1987); 
JOY CHERIAN, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION: THE WORLD BANK CONVENTION 
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1975); Georges R. Delaume, Sovereign 
Immunity and Transnational Arbitration, 3 ARB. INT’L 28 (1987); Paul D. Friedland, 
Provisional Measures in ICSID Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L 335 (1986); ANNULMENT OF ICSID 
AWARDS (E. Gaillard & Y. Banifatemi eds., 2004); Carolyn B. Lamm & Abby Cohen 
Smutney, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Responses to 
Problems and Changing Requirements, 12 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 20 (1997); K. NATHAN, 
THE ICSID CONVENTION: THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2000); Antonio R. Parra, The Practices and Experience of the ICSID, 
in CONSERVATORY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 37 (1993); 
Christoph Schreuer, International and Domestic Law in Investment Disputes: The Case of 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008
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and allows trade with China in the form of the CIETAC arbitral mechanism.17  
Arbitration can tame political and mixed political-legal controversies. 
Despite its depth and size, the revolution in law through arbitration has barely 
been noticed by the affected community.  Arbitration is the proverbial elephant in the 
room.  Annual International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings receive 
greater attention and inspire more passionate protests.18  Buildings have not been left 
in smoldering ruins.  The Justices do not announce their rulings on arbitration 
wearing the wired spectacles of the erstwhile revolutionary.  There are no rituals for 
the partisans in which they chant verses from the Uniform Law on Arbitration or 
landmark court cases.  Crowned monarchs are not paraded on the guillotine.  
Practitioners and lower courts are aware of arbitration, but they have simply adapted 
to it as their business dictates.  Law schools, the truly glacial visionaries of the legal 
profession, have glanced at arbitration with a blind eye.  At best, they see it as a 
peripheral international development deserving only an inaudible whisper among the 
shouts for primacy in the established curriculum. 
Although the Justices are a very unlikely group of radicals bent on anarchistic 
upheaval, the U.S. Supreme Court has spearheaded the revolution.19  In fact, the 
revolution has been conducted, and its story told, by the U.S. Supreme Court.  At 
every stage of arbitration’s ascendancy, the Court has provided the necessary 
doctrinal pronouncements and political muscle to confirm the gains achieved and to 
advance the process to the next level of its reformation.20  The most elevated oracle 
of American law ironically made the redefinition of American law and procedure 
tenable and then compelling.  As is often the case, the revolution was itself a 
contradiction in terms:  To maintain the rule of law, the Court divested the courts and 
the law of their established authority and invested that power and function in a 
                                                          
ICSID, 1 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 89 (1996); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Experience of 
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT L.J. 299 (1999); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & ARBITRATION: LEADING 
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Todd Weiler ed., 2005). 
17CIETAC stands for the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission.  See, e.g., Cederic Chao & James Schurz, International Arbitration: Selecting 
the Proper Forum, 17 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 41 (2002); Sally A. Harpole, Factors 
Affecting the Growth (or Lack Thereof) of Arbitration in the Asia Region, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 89 
(2003); Huang Yanmin, The Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitrations, 12 J. INT’L ARB. 5 
(1995); SELECTED WORKS OF CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION AWARDS (1989-1995; updated to 1997) (P. Leung Mei-fun & Wang Sheng-chang 
eds., 1998); Vladislav Pechota, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC), in W.A.R. 4315 (Hans Smit & Vladislav Pechota eds., 2002); Wang 
Sheng-chang, Practical Aspects of Foreign-Related Arbitration in China, 1997 Y.B. SWEDISH 
& INT’L ARB. 45 (1997). 
18See Michael E. Ruane, Protesters Link War, Warming; Latest Rally Tied to IMF, World 
Bank Meetings Focuses on Climate Change, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2007, at B1; Clarence 
Williams & Michael E. Ruane, Violence Erupts at Protest in Georgetown; Rallies Target 
World Bank, IMF, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2007, at B1. 
19CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 77-189. 
20Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss2/3
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private process of adjudication with nearly unlimited jurisdictional reach.21  The 
revolutionary character of the case law on arbitration arises from the challenge it 
poses to the constitutional imperatives that prevailed prior to its articulation.  The 
case law rulings were the rough equivalent of a Roman Catholic Pontiff proclaiming 
established Church creeds to be merely one possible belief system among many 
others, including agnosticism and atheism.  The declared judicial policy on 
arbitration was, in effect, theological blasphemy. 
The courts are the gatekeepers of arbitration dogma.  The decisional law of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, reveals that the Court believes the gate opens only in 
one direction.22  The general U.S. judicial stance, as a result, is that the recourse to 
arbitration must be sustained in nearly all circumstances.23  Even the principle of 
freedom of contract yields to the arbitration imperative:  Party choice-of-law cannot 
defeat the reference to arbitration.24  There are periodic dissensions, especially in 
                                                                
21Id. 
22See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) and infra note 73; 
Doctor’s Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) and infra note 74; Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-64 (1995).  See also Henry Gamble Appel, 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 233 (1996); 
Norman B. Arnoff, In the Wake of Mastrobuono, 950 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 825 (1996); Joshua 
M. Barrett, Federal Arbitration Policy After Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 
32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 517 (1996); Perry E. Casazza, Nevada’s Mastrobuono: How the 2001 
Legislature Threw Another Wrench into the Punitive Damages Machine of Arbitration Law, 
51 DRAKE L. REV. 189 (2002); John P. Cleary, Filling Mastrobuono’s Order: The NASD 
Arbitration Policy Task Force Ensures the Enforceability of Punitive Damages Awards in 
Securities Arbitration, 52 BUS. LAW. 199 (1996); Keith Highet, International Decisions, 89 
AM. J. INT’L L. 601 (1995); Andrew C. Glass, The Validity of Arbitral Awards of Punitive 
Damages, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 193 (1996); John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive 
Damages in International Commercial Arbitrations in the Wake of Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 59 (1997); Heather J. Haase, In Defense of Parties’ 
Rights to Limit Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Mastrobuono v. Shearson 
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 309 (1996); Paul Lansing, The Future of 
Punitive Damage Awards in Securities Arbitration Cases After Mastrobuono, 8 DEPAUL BUS. 
L.J. 201 (1996); Edward B. Micheletti, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.: 
Another Piece of the Federal Arbitration Act Policy Puzzle, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1027 (1996); 
Peter M. Mundheim, The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: 
Challenges Facing the Industry Regulators in the Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
197 (1995); Jordan L. Resnick, Beyond Mastrobuono: A Practitioner’s Guide to Arbitration, 
Employment Disputes, Punitive Damages, and the Implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (1995); G. Richard Shell, Federal Versus State Law in the 
Interpretation of Contracts Containing Arbitration Clauses: Reflections on Mastrobuono, 65 
U. CIN. L. REV. 43 (1996); Victor Williams, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Mastrobuono 
and the Need for Creation of a National Court of Commercial Appeals, 100 COM. L.J. 281 
(1995); Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration 
Act Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250 (2002); Award of Punitive Damages Upheld Under 
Mastrobuono, 51-SEP. DISP. RESOL. J. 147 (1996). 
23Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1999). Harris addresses 
the consumer arbitration issues in regard to the disparity in bargaining power between two 
parties.  Id. at 179-81.  The court found that an arbitration clause, granting the right to 
litigation to only one of the contracting parties was enforceable under the FAA.  Id. at 183. 
24Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62-64. 
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employment and consumer cases,25 but arbitration agreements are enforceable in the 
vast majority of cases—even when they are unilateral and adhesionary in character.26  
Manifest unfairness is not necessarily a defense to enforceability.27  Moreover, 
arbitrators and service providers are immune from suit.28  There is no arbitral 
malpractice, unless the arbitrator simply refuses to act.29  The watchwords of 
                                                                
25See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  The court in Ting held that it 
was illegal to use a mandatory arbitration clause to make it difficult for consumers to sue 
AT&T.  Id. at 923-26.  The same court also held electronic arbitration agreements as 
substantively unconscionable in Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002), 
and Acorn v. Household International, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  See also 
Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001) (found an  arbitration 
agreement invalid as an illusory promise when an employer required an employee to enter into 
a contract with an arbitral service provider); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (established a five-point minimum requirement standard 
for a legally enforceable arbitration agreement in the employment context); Hayes v. County 
Bank, 713 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (held that the FAA permits setting aside 
arbitration agreements on unconscionability grounds, and a payday loan  scheme with such a 
contract was found to be unconscionable); Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (held that a usury violation is not arbitrable; it is a matter for the 
courts).  Given the decision in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 
(2003), the decision in Party Yards is at least suspect, if not in fact reversed. Shankle v. B-G 
Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (ruled that an 
arbitration agreement was unenforceable when it functioned as a condition of employment or 
continued employment and deprived the weaker party of any recourse because of the costs of 
arbitration); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (held that that 
an arbitration clause in cellphone contracts was unconscionable because it was unilaterally 
prepared and sent to customers with a monthly bill); but see Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 
1997) (found an arbitration agreement void because its terms did not accurately represent the 
actual conduct of the arbitral proceedings and allowed the stronger party to overreach upon the 
weaker party by acting as the self-interested administrator of the proceedings); Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (ruled that an employee is not bound by an 
arbitration agreement in the collective bargaining agreement in terms of the resolution of 
personal rights claims). 
26Harris, 183 F.3d at 183-84. 
27One court reasoned that “[the] substantive federal law stands for the proposition that 
parties to an arbitration agreement need not equally bind each other with respect to an 
arbitration agreement if they have provided each other with consideration beyond the promise 
to arbitrate.” 183 F.3d at 180. The court further stated that, “[i]t is of no legal consequence that 
the arbitration clause gives Green Tree the option to litigate arbitrable issues in court, while 
requiring the Harrises to invoke arbitration.” Id. at 181. 
28THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1990); see also, e.g., Martin 
Domke, The Arbitrator’s Immunity from Liability: A Comparative Survey, 3 U. TOL. L. REV. 
99 (1971); Mark. W. Levine, Note, The Immunity of Arbitrators and the Duty to Disclose, 6 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 197 (1995); Richard J. Mattera, Note, Has the Expansion of Arbitral 
Immunity Reached Its Limits After United States v. City of Hayward?, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 779 (1997); Andrea Mettler, Immunity vs. Liability in Arbitral Adjudication, 47 ARB. J. 
24 (1992); Michael D. Moberly, Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims for Equitable Relief, 5 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 325 (2005). 
29See Morgan Phillips, Inc. v. JAMS/Endispute, L.L.C., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782, 785 (2006).   
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arbitration doctrine appear to be:  inviolable autonomy and absolute decisional 
sovereignty. 
Courts cannot assume more aggressive or activist regulatory roles in regard to 
arbitration because experience demonstrates the wisdom of the Court’s absolute 
support for arbitration.  The Court refuses to admit any exception to its policy of 
enforcement because limited incursions into the territory would inevitably lead to 
wholesale migrations.  Allowing the camel to peer under the tent will almost 
certainly bring about its collapse.  Judges are likely to find fault with the arbitrators’ 
performance ever more readily and frequently if for no other reason than that 
disagreement is the lifeblood of legal discourse.  Halligan30 and Exxon Shipping31 
illustrate the nefarious consequences of a more than limited judicial involvement in 
arbitration.  In the end, the judicial role should be confined to policing the process 
for denials of justice in circumstances of fraud or corruption. 
Nonetheless, there is constant pressure to alter the dynamics of the process and to 
provide for greater rights protection—e.g., the use of the unconscionability defense,32 
                                                                
30Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).  See Mark B. Rees, Note, 
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray: The Collision Between Arbitral Autonomy and Judicial Review, 8 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 347 (1997). 
31Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 11 F.3d 1189 (3d Cir. 1993).  See, e.g., 
Thomas E. Claps, An Arbitration Award Reinstating Helmsman Who Tested Positive for 
Marijuana Use May Be Vacated for Contravening Public Policy Against the Operation of Sea 
Vessels by Drug Users – Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357 
(3d Cir. 1993), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 541 (1993); Gregory T. Mayes, The Third Circuit 
Defines the Public Policy Exception to Labor Arbitration Awards – Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Exxon Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), 67 TEMP. L. REV. 493 (1994). 
32Courts have previously found arbitral agreements to be unconscionable.  See, e.g., Comb 
v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 
(N.D. Cal. 2002); Powertel Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Brower 
v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), however, held that arbitration is 
neither inferior to judicial litigation nor unfair.  Id. at 34.  Thus, it usually is not sufficient 
(except in a few California state law cases) to establish that an adhesionary arbitration 
agreement is procedurally unconscionable.  Such an assertion states no more than that the 
adhesion contract is adhesionary.  Ordinarily, establishing the oppressive quality of the 
material terms (or substantive unconscionability) is essential to a determination of 
unconscionability.  CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 392. 
The conscionability of arbitration in consumer disputes can be judged according to the 
following principles: 
1. “All parties are entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process,” 
including (in Principle 12) adequate notice; the opportunity to be 
heard; to present relevant evidence; and the right to an appropriate 
exchange of relevant information prior to the hearing (Principle 13). 
2. Consumers should be given adequate information at the time of the 
contract about the nature of the chosen program. 
3. All neutrals should be neutral, and consumers should have an equal 
voice in selecting them for their case. 
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common law grounds for vacatur,33 actions to clarify awards,34 and opt-in provisions 
for enhanced judicial review35—all developments that increase judicial supervision 
of the arbitral process’ operation and results.  This minority trend is most apparent in 
California—previously at both the federal and state court level, but now principally 
                                                          
4. The competency of neutrals is expected and is an obligation of the 
independent agencies that administer the arbitration. 
5. In low-value cases where arbitration itself would be more expensive 
for the consumer than small claims court, the consumer should retain 
the right to take a matter to the small claims process. 
6. The cost of arbitration to the consumer should be reasonable in 
relation to the deal, even if that means the other party must subsidize 
the cost. 
7. The location of arbitration proceedings must be convenient to the 
consumer. 
8. All time limits should be reasonable, and defaults out of the process 
should be allowed where the limits are exceeded or abused. 
9. Consumers should be allowed to appear with legal counsel or other 
representatives whom they choose. 
Id. at 392-93 (parsing the actual language of the AAA’s Consumer Protocol). 
33The common law grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards in the United States are: (1) 
manifest disregard of the law, (2) irrational determinations, or (3) enforcement of the award 
violates public policy.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2004, supra 
note 6, at 33-34.  For examples of manifest disregard of law, see, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, 
Lyon & Ross, 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986); Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 882 F. Supp. 1202 
(D.P.R. 1995); Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  For examples 
of irrational determinations, see, e.g., Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 
1994); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1993); Ainsworth v. 
Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992).  For examples when enforcement of the award would 
have violated public policy, see, e.g., Rodriguez, 882 F. Supp. at 1208; Exxon Shipping, 11 
F.3d at 1191; Brown, 994 F.2d at 782-83.  
34Section 11 of the FAA does not authorize such an action, rather actions to clarify an 
award arose through judicial decisions.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 246.  
Actions seeking clarification undermine the efficiency of arbitration.  Id. at 247.  Actions to 
clarify are similar to vacatur for manifest disregard of the law, both of which are antagonistic 
to the functionality of arbitration.  See Hardy v. Walsh Manning Sec., L.L.C., 341 F.3d 126 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
35The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits oppose the enforceability 
of opt-in provisions.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2004, supra 
note 6, at 34.  These courts reason that parties cannot create federal jurisdiction by contract.  
See, e.g., Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); Chi. Typographical 
Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991).  Opt-in provisions 
alter the concept of bargained-for arbitration by “radicalizing” the guiding principle of 
contract freedom.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 243-46.  The FAA makes no 
mention of opt-in provisions.  Id. at 245. Nonetheless, opt-in provisions find their strongest 
support in the principle of freedom of contract.  Id. 
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in state court rulings.36  The opposition to the federal concept of arbitration is 
evidenced in key California Supreme Court cases, like Engalla37 and Armendariz,38 
in which the court put doctrines other than arbitrability first and risked running afoul 
of the federal preemption mandate.  To some extent, the California resistance is 
incomprehensible in light of the state’s long-standing acquaintance with arbitration 
and ADR, the size of the industry in the state, and the large number of former state 
judges who have found a calling in the arbitration business.39  Having trained and 
                                                                
36After Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Ninth Circuit tempered its 
opposition of arbitration.  California state courts, however, still reach determinations in 
employment arbitration cases that strongly disfavor the recourse to arbitration.  See, e.g., 
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007); Murphy v. Check ’N Go of Cal., Inc., 67 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 120 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Marcario v. County of Orange, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007); Matthau v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
37Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).  See, e.g., John W. 
Corrington, Where a Health Maintenance Organization Makes Contractual Promises of 
Expeditious Claim Processing in an Arbitration Agreement, with the Knowledge They Are 
Likely False and with the Intent to Induce Reliance on the Part of the Insured, the Insured 
May Seek Remedies in Court, Including Rescission of the Agreement.  And, a Court May Deny 
a Petition to Compel Arbitration Based on Theories of Fraud in the Inducement or Waiver of 
the Agreement: Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 25 PEPP. L. REV. 235 (1997); 
Russell Evans, Note, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.: Can Arbitration Clauses in 
Employment Contracts Survive a “Fairness” Analysis?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1999); Jim 
Moore, Note, Bad Facts, Good Law – Thoughts on Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 26 
W. ST. U. L. REV. 135 (1999). 
38Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).  See, e.g., 
California Supreme Court Decides Armendariz, 11 WORLD. ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 267 
(2000); Shane Anderies, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Individual Employment 
Contracts After Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.: A Note on Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 765 (2000); Bernard Finnegan, Note, The 
California Supreme Court Framework for Mandatory Arbitration Agreements: Armendariz v. 
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 571 (2002); Earl Greene III, 
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.: The California Supreme Court 
Searches for a Middle Ground, 1 J. AM. ARB. 105 (2001); S. Kathleen Isbell, Note, 
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Agreements: Beneficent Shield or Sword of 
Oppression? Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 
1107 (2001); Jennifer LaFond, Note, The Private Enforcement of Public Laws in Armendariz 
v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 401 (2002); Aaron Rudin, 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 30 SW. U. L. REV. 613 (2001); Mark S. 
Ross, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Disputes After Armendariz, 651 PRACTISING 
LAW INSTITUTE/ LITIGATION 251 (2001). 
39Unless the arbitrator is a technical expert and the dispute a highly involved technical 
matter, procedural and substantive rights may not be compromised in arbitration.  At their 
core, arbitral proceedings provide a reasonably complete hearing of the matter in which all 
essential issues are addressed.  The arbitral hearing is not unlike a bench trial in which the 
absence of a jury alleviates the need for elaborate rule frameworks through which information 
is filtered.  In fact, especially in California, arbitrators often are retired judges who have 
extensive familiarity with legal procedures for trial.  Non-jury trials and less formalistic 
procedures may constitute a better vehicle for rights protection than constitutionally elaborate 
proceedings.  Rights protection taken to its adversarial extreme resulted in the impossibility of 
vindicating legal rights through judicial litigation.  The success, and perhaps the irreversibility, 
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experienced jurists act as arbitrators in the state should assuage the concerns of 
California judges about fairness and rights protection.  The temptation to do what 
courts generally do must be resisted to preserve the advantages, utility, and 
functionality of arbitration.  Any judicial intrusion compromises arbitration’s 
benefits and essential attributes—operational efficiency and functionality. 
II.  HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
In the nineteenth and through part of the twentieth century, courts and 
legislatures perceived arbitration as a renegade, even bastardized form of 
adjudication.  Optimally, it could be applied only in specialized fields.  As a 
makeshift form of trial, arbitration was adequate only for self-regulated industries 
involved in the sale of commodities or other basic commercial activities.40  Prior to 
the enactment of the U.S. Arbitration Act (also known as the Federal Arbitration Act 
or FAA)41 in 1925, courts also perceived arbitration as a competitor for adjudicatory 
business.42  In this sibling contest, courts wanted to retain primacy, if not exclusivity, 
in matters of litigation.  Accordingly, courts disparaged arbitration; they invented 
reasons to distrust the arbitrators’ abilities to apply the law and to protect essential 
legal rights. 
Court rulings, therefore, tried to undermine the agreement to arbitrate.  Early on, 
courts would only enforce an arbitration agreement if the arbitral tribunal had 
already rendered an award.43  Legislatures joined in the dance of hostility around 
arbitration by voiding the contract validity of the arbitral clauses and providing 
exclusively for the enforceability of the submission to arbitration.44  The submission 
                                                          
of the movement to arbitration is inextricably tied to the dispute resolution failure of the court 
system.  As the adage provides, justice delayed is justice denied.  
40See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 10 (1968). 
41U.S. Arbitration Act, Ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006)). 
42The early judicial hostility towards arbitration is easily summed up: 
[W]hen [courts] are asked to . . . compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award 
shall be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals possess 
adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel a reluctant 
party to submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him the doors of the common 
courts of justice, provided by the government to protect rights and to redress wrongs. 
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 
3, at 49 (citing Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) 
(No. 14,065)).  See also, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and 
the New York Statute, 31 YALE L.J. 147 (1921); Walter B. Kennedy, Law and the Railroad 
Labor Problem, 32 YALE L.J. 553 (1923). 
43CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, 
supra note 3, at 49.  
44The typical civilian approach to arbitration at the turn of the century was to uphold as 
legal only the submission to arbitration and to deny enforceability to the arbitral clause.  
Because parties in dispute were unlikely to agree to arbitration, this rule, in effect, invalidated 
the reference to arbitration.  See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court 
Doctrine on International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial 
Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1980); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reform of the French 
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could only be entered into after a dispute had arisen, and parties were unlikely to 
agree to arbitration when their relationship had degenerated into turmoil.  By limiting 
access to arbitration and eventually allowing courts to question the rulings of 
arbitrators,45 legislation eliminated the gravamen for arbitration; both the motive and 
the consideration for recourse had been extinguished.  Courts achieved the standing 
they sought; they monopolized the work of justice.  By containing the arbitral 
process, courts proclaimed the singularity of the judicial protection of legal rights.  
Further, they touted their exclusive ability to act for the public interest. 
III.  THE FAA 
The FAA was enacted as special interest legislation.46  It was a far cry from a 
comprehensive statute on arbitration.  Its goals were modest—to rehabilitate 
arbitration for groups within the commercial community.  The impetus for its 
enactment centered around a recent New York state law on arbitration.47  The New 
York Chamber of Commerce believed that a federal law on arbitration was necessary 
to complement the state legislation that favored arbitration.48  In the age of Swift v. 
Tyson,49 federal courts needed a federal statute on arbitration to enforce arbitration 
agreements when they ruled in litigation on the basis of diversity.50  The FAA, 
therefore, was not a sequel to the Magna Carta; it represented, in fact, a small 
                                                          
Procedural Law on Arbitration: An Analytical Commentary on the Decree of May 14, 1980, 4 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 273 (1981). 
45British law allows courts to revise arbitral awards that are clearly wrong on the law.  
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 
3, at 24.  In the United States, the Fifth and Third Circuits allow parties to contract for judicial 
review of arbitral awards.  See, e.g., Gateway Techs. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 
(5th Cir. 1995); New Eng. Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998).  
46See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its 
Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX. INT’L L.J. 33, 39-57 
(1984); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. 
REV. 263 (1988) [hereinafter Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration].  See also JON O. 
SHIMABUKURO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND 
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT (2003) http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-
crs-3879; Preston Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court’s Expansive 
Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2,  
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499 (1995).   
47The New York business community wanted to avoid the procedural intricacies and 
delays of judicial litigation.  Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 
supra note 46, at 268.  It sought a commercially reasonable and knowledgeable dispute 
resolution process, which provided efficient, workable resolutions.  Id.  Arbitration was the 
remedy chosen.  Id.  The New York Chamber of Commerce persuaded the U.S. Congress to 
follow the New York legislative example and the FAA was born.  Id.  
48See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.   
49Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  Swift provided for the application of a general federal 
common law by federal courts.  See, e.g., Coker B. Cleveland, Note, Steamfitters Local Union 
No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris: Is Swift v. Tyson Dead?, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
145 (2001). 
50See supra notes 46-48. 
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concession to the commercial interests in New York City.  In effect, the FAA 
reinforced the mercantile interest in self-regulation and customized adjudicatory 
procedures.  It represented a legislative acknowledgement of the self-governing ethos 
of trade and commerce—a ceding of power to affected groups permitting expedient 
solutions to commercial and transactional disputes. 
The FAA’s actual impact upon the legal system was unexpected both in terms of 
size and intensity.  The evolution and progressive interpretation of the statute, in 
effect, resulted in a redefinition of civil justice, a modification of the Bill of Rights, 
and the implicit emendation of the U.S. Constitution.  Arbitration, modestly 
validated in 1925, was to have an enormous destiny in a later age of limited 
resources, greater litigation, and more populous urban growth.  Like the Federal 
Sovereign Immunities Act51 and the New York Arbitration Convention,52 the FAA is 
a “marvel of compression.”53  It is a statute that achieves its regulatory purpose on 
the basis of an economical text.54  The FAA’s central provisions are §§ 1, 2, 3, and 
10—2 and 10 are all that is really necessary.  The statute has a total of sixteen 
provisions, most of which are quite brief. 
                                                                
5128 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2006).  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is “[a]n Act [t]o 
define the jurisdiction of the United States courts in suits against foreign states, the 
circumstances in which foreign states are immune from suit and in which execution may not 
be levied on their property, and for other purposes.”  THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASE AND 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 158 (2005) (citing the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act).  See also, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Texas 
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); Playa 
Larga v. I Congreso del Partido, (1983) 1 A.C. 244 (H.L.); In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 
(S.D. Tex. 1982); Victory Transp. v. Comisaria General De Abastecimientos y Transportes, 
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Robert von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33 (1978). 
52Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 
2517.  The New York Convention is entered into force in U.S. law under 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08.  
The Convention provides a uniform law on both the validity of arbitration agreements and the 
enforceability of arbitral awards.  See, e.g., Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnia, S.p.A., 77 F. Supp. 
2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 
(2d Cir. 1997); In re the Arbitration of Certain Controversies Between Chromalloy 
Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996); Hamid G. 
Gharavi, Chromalloy: Another View, 12-1 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 16 (1997); Hamid G. 
Gharavi, Enforcing Set Aside Arbitral Awards: France’s Controversial Steps Beyond the New 
York Convention, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 93 (1996); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the 
N.Y. Convention: Further Reflections on Chromalloy, 12-4 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 12 
(1997); Gary H. Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in Their 
Country of Origin, 11-9 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 17 (1996). 
53Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306. 
54The statute provides comprehensive regulation of the arbitration process through sixteen 
relatively cryptic provisions.  Of the sixteen provisions, four provide the near totality of the 
relevant law:  Sections 2, 3, 4, and 10. 
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Section One establishes the statute’s scope of application.55  The FAA applies in 
the traditional areas of federal jurisdiction:  Interstate and foreign commerce, and 
maritime transactions.  The text of the provision expressly excludes employment 
contracts from its scope of application.  This restriction emerged from the special 
protections that applied under federal law for certain classes of employees and from 
the drafters’ perception that the disparity of the parties’ positions in employment 
relationships did not permit truly consensual recourse to arbitral adjudication.  The 
restriction would later be construed narrowly and differently by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  As noted in the earlier discussion,56 the federal statute was meant merely to 
serve as a gap-filler in a system in which the assertion of judicial jurisdiction was 
controlled by Swift v. Tyson. 
Of the provisions of the FAA, “[s]ection 2 is the centerpiece provision of the 
legislation.”57  It validates arbitration agreements as contracts.  In particular, the 
waiver of recourse to judicial process before any dispute arises is not against public 
policy.  Arbitration agreements are ordinary contracts and lawful; contracting parties 
are free to submit their disputes to arbitration because it is part of their freedom to 
contract.  Section Three provides that a valid contract of arbitration forecloses access 
to courts.58  This eliminates the courts’ authority to rule on disputes that are subject 
to arbitration.  The federal district court determines whether a valid contract of 
arbitration exists and whether it governs the dispute in question.  An affirmative 
finding usually results in a stay, rather than a dismissal, of the judicial proceedings, 
allowing the court to assist in the operation of the arbitral process when necessary.  
FAA § 3 enables the courts to perform a critical jurisdictional function at the 
threshold of the process—in effect, determining whether the arbitrators have the 
authority to rule.  A more contemporary view, and a truer measure, of arbitral 
autonomy would allow the arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction first under the 
kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine.59   
Section Four establishes that courts may compel arbitration once they determine 
that a valid contract of arbitration exists and they are asked to do so by an interested 
                                                                
559 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006);  IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW (1992); I. 
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT; see also, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 539 U.S. 52 
(2003); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 348 (8th Cir. 
2005); Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005); Palcko v. Airborne 
Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588 (3d Cir. 2004). 
56Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
579 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, 
supra note 1, at 99. 
589 U.S.C. § 3 (2006); CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, 
supra note 1, at 115. See also sources cited supra note 55.  
59This doctrine is defined as “jurisdiction to rule on jurisdictional challenges involving the 
validity and scope of the arbitration agreement.”  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 27. 
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party.60  It also makes reference to a jury trial proceeding to determine the existence 
of the agreement to arbitrate.  Despite the impracticality and consequently inactive 
status of the latter,61 the provision generally endeavors to establish a cooperative 
relationship between the judicial and arbitral processes.  Section Ten is second only 
to Section Two in doctrinal and historical significance.62  It establishes the basis for 
the judicial supervision of arbitral awards.  The supervisory role of the courts is 
limited; it encompasses only looking for fundamental procedural irregularities that 
evidence corruption in the arbitral proceeding:  bribery, evident partiality of the 
arbitrator, a lack of notice or opportunity to defend, and the excessive exercise of 
adjudicatory authority by arbitrators.63  The grounds for judicial supervision are 
intended to prevent miscarriages of justice.  The narrowness and exceptional 
character of the grounds indicate that a presumption in favor of enforcement applies 
and can be rebutted only in extraordinary circumstances.  Review of the merits of 
arbitral determinations is excluded under the express language of FAA § 10, 
although parties may provide for it in their contracts in some federal circuits (so-
called opt-in provisions)64 and courts may have recourse to common law grounds for 
vacatur to assess arbitrator rulings.65 
                                                                
609 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, Arbitration and Class Actions: A 
Contradiction in Terms, 1590 PRACTISING L. INST. 427 (2007); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); 
Discover Bank v. Vaden , 396 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2005); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 
269, 274-77 (7th Cir. 1995); Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F.Supp. 2d 1278 (M.D. Ala. 
2005); Green Tree Consumer Disc. Co. v. Jarvis, No. 01-2479 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
61According to the statutory language, a party can demand a jury trial on the merits to 
determine the existence of the arbitral clause.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 118.  See Pyle v. Wells Fargo Fin., No. 04AP-6, 2004 WL 
2065652, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004). 
629 U.S.C. § 10.  Section 10 gives a federal district court jurisdiction to confirm or set 
aside an arbitral award through vacatur. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 2004, supra note 6, at 108-11.  The courts have fully embraced their limited role 
in arbitration.  Id.  The statutory grounds avoid the substantive review of arbitral awards, and 
limit the courts’ supervision to incidents of fundamental procedural unfairness.  Id. 
63Corruption in the arbitral procedure, the arbitrators, or the determination justifies the 
judicial vacatur of an arbitral award.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 
2007, supra note 1, 124-27. 
64Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213 (2005) [hereinafter Carbonneau, Crossroads of Legitimacy]; 
Thomas Carbonneau, Debating the Proper Role of National Law Under the New York 
Arbitration Convention, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277 (1998); James M. Gaitis, Unraveling 
the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise 
of Party Autonomy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2007); Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding 
Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 DISP. RESOL. 
J. 16 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons 
from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99 (2007); Marisa Marinelli & Christelette 
Hoey, As Judicial Tolerance for Appeals Wanes, Litigants are Risking Sanctions When 
Seeking to Vacate Awards, 25 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LIT. 51 (2007); Thomas S. 
Meriwether, Limiting Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: 
Striking the Right Balance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 739 (2007); Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell 
Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 
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In effect, the core statutory provisions attribute a supportive yet passive role to 
the courts in regard to arbitration.  The judiciary supplies coercive public 
jurisdictional authority when the arbitral process is at an impasse.  The courts uphold 
the contract reference to arbitration and otherwise allow arbitration to function 
according to its own operational dynamic and systemic exigencies.  The FAA 
recognizes both the specialty and self-regulatory character of commercial justice. 
IV.  THE POST-ERIE FAA 
The serenity that surrounded the parochial objectives of the FAA’s original 
enactment would eventually be disturbed.  The statute would seep out of its 
circumstantial confines.  The U.S. Supreme Court would progressively use the FAA 
as a roadmap to a new legal civilization.66  Sometime after the enactment of the 
FAA, Erie67 ended the rule of Swift v. Tyson.  Erie’s impact upon the FAA was 
considerable.  According to Erie federalism, the FAA became secondary to state law 
in diversity circumstances when state law governed the litigation.  In fact, state law 
would generally apply unless the litigation involved matters that raised federal 
question jurisdiction.  The FAA did not provide federal question jurisdiction.  
Therefore, it appeared that federal courts sitting in diversity would apply state law to 
contract litigation and would also be obligated to apply a state’s arbitration law in the 
case.  That state’s arbitration statute could well be antagonistic or at least less 
favorable to arbitration than the FAA. 
The FAA, however, was no longer a mere gap-filler, but rather the repository of a 
nascent federal policy.  It was imperative that federal courts maintain their allegiance 
to federal law in matters of arbitration.  Federalization was the means to achieve that 
end.68  The Court began to realize that arbitration was no longer just a commercial 
                                                          
(2004); Michael P. O’Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities 
Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1121 (1995); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147 (1997). 
The Supreme Court will soon review private parties’ ability to modify the statutory 
standard for judicial review in Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 06-989, 128 S.Ct. 644 
(Nov. 16, 2007).  
65Supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
66See Carbonneau, Plea for Statutory Reform, supra note 1, at 231.  
67Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson stating that 
there is no federal common law, and that Congress cannot declare substantive rules of 
common law applicable in the states.  Id. at 78.  State law applied in cases of diversity 
jurisdiction unless the controversy was governed by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Id.   
See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid 
the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999). 
68The author has previously reasoned that: 
The application of state arbitration laws by federal courts sitting in diversity could 
have fragmented any national consensus on arbitration and undermined the FAA’s 
clear mandate to make arbitration an autonomous and viable alternative adjudicatory 
process. . . . Because Erie mandated the application of state law in all diversity cases 
but those in which the U.S. Constitution or federal legislation was controlling, courts 
could hold that the FAA was applicable as a federal enactment, ruling – in effect – that 
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remedy, but presented a solution to the paucity of judicial resources and to the 
cancerous effect of adversarial litigation upon the processing of claims.  
Transforming arbitration from a specialized form of justice for merchants to a 
society-wide framework of adjudication resolved the operational deficiencies of a 
dysfunctional court system.  Many state laws did not favor arbitration,69 and the 
Court felt that it was imperative that arbitration be validated as an adjudicatory 
method in all circumstances. 
The holding in Prima Paint70 was the first step in the federalization of the law of 
arbitration and in establishing a single national law of arbitration.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court responded to the question of whether federal courts sitting in diversity should 
apply the FAA by stating that Congress had the authority to instruct Article III courts 
on how they should rule on a particular substantive question.71  The FAA constituted 
that instruction.  The federal statute applied even though state law governed other 
aspects of the litigation.  The hegemony of the FAA extended to any interstate 
commerce matter.  A full policy of federalization would be achieved through the 
                                                          
the FAA represented more than the enactment of merely procedural regulations and 
that it actually created substantive federal rights. 
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 155-56.  
69See MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., Scope of United States Arbitration Act-Preemption of 
Contrary State Law, in DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, §7:7 (2007); Edmond Seferi, 
FAA and Arbitration Clauses – How Far Can it Reach? The Effect of Allied-Bruce Terminix, 
Inc. v. Dobson, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 607  (1997) (citing ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1984)); Ex 
Parte Clements, 587 So. 2d 317, 320 (Ala. 1991) (“[U]nless the FAA is applicable, predispute 
arbitration agreements are void in Alabama as against public policy.”); State v. Neb. Ass’n of 
Pub. Employees, 477 N.W. 2d 577 (Neb. 1991) (ruling that a state statute adopting the 
Uniform Arbitration Act was void as violating the state constitution); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-
15-101 (West 1992) (arbitration contracts void as against public policy except in construction 
contracts). 
70Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  See, e.g., Pierre 
H. Bergeron, At the Crossroads of Federalism and Arbitration: The Application of Prima Paint 
to Purportedly Void Contracts, 93 KY. L. J. 423 (2005); Alfred Croce, The Sixth Circuit Rules 
on the Severability of Arbitration Provisions under Prima Paint and the Application of the 
Parol Evidence Rule Under Ohio Law in Glazer v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 4 J. AM. ARB. 159 
(2005); Zeb-Michael Curtin, Rethinking Prima Paint Separability in Today’s Changed 
Arbitration Regime: The Case for Inseparability and Judicial Decisionmaking in the Context 
of Mental Incapacity Defenses, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1905 (2005); Andre V. Egle, Back to Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.: To Challenge an Arbitration Agreement 
You Must Challenge the Arbitration Agreement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 199 (2003); Mikel D. 
Johnson, Case Note, Contracts – Into the Void: Minnesota Limits Application of the Prima 
Paint Doctrine – Onvoy, Inc. v. Shal, LLC, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 579 (2004); Nancy R. 
Kornegay, Prima Paint to First Options: The Supreme Court’s Procrustean Approach to the 
Federal Arbitration Act and Fraud, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 335 (2001); Supreme Court to Review 
Florida Court’s Rejection of Prima Paint, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 4 (2005). 
71THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 158; CARBONNEAU, 
NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 95-105; see also, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial 
Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea of Change, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 
(1996); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1305 (1985); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in 
Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004).  
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Court’s later pronouncements in the federalism trilogy72 and reaffirmed 
unequivocally in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.  v. Dobson73 and Doctor’s Associates, 
Inc.74 
V.  THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT ARBITRATION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on labor arbitration presaged much of the 
decisional transformation of the FAA.  The Court envisaged labor arbitration as a 
means of avoiding labor strikes and resolving other strife in the workplace.75  The 
                                                                
72The federalism trilogy consists of: Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).  The Court in Moses Cone stated: “[t]he 
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay or a like defense 
to arbitrability.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. Keating extended the 
preference toward arbitration and created a duty upon not only federal courts, but also state 
courts to apply the federal policy on arbitration.  Keating, 465 U.S. at 10. Finally, Byrd 
included the proclamation that “the Act leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a 
district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to 
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”  Byrd, 470 U.S. at 
213.  
73Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).  See, e.g., Megan P. Davis, 
Case Comment, From Procedural Law to Preemption: The Supreme Court’s Transformation 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 169 (1996); Janet M. 
Grossnickle, Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the Federal Arbitration Act 
Will Keep Consumers and Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. REV. 769 (1995); 
Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated Alabama’s 
Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577 (1996); Lauri Washington Sawyer, Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Companies v. Dobson: The Implementation of the Purposes of the Federal 
Arbitration Act or an Unjustified Intrusion into State Sovereignty?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 645 
(1996); Edmond Seferi, FAA and Arbitration Clauses – How Far Can it Reach? The Effect of 
Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 607 (1997); Henry C. 
Strickland, Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson: Widespread Enforcement of Arbitration 
Agreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA. LAW. 238 (1995); Scott R. Swier, The Tenuous Tale 
of the Terrible Termites: The Federal Arbitration Act and the Court’s Decision to Interpret 
Section Two in the Broadest Possible Manner: Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. 
Dobson, 41 S.D. L. REV. 131 (1996); Jay A. Yurkiw, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 223 (1996). 
74Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  See, e.g., Sandra F. Gavin, 
Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements 10 Years 
After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 249 (2006); David Ling, 
Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements: States’ Options After Casarotto, 2 HARV. 
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 193 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001 (1996). 
75The Court reasoned that “[t]he question is not whether in the mind of the court there is 
equity in the claim. Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as a vehicle for 
handling any and all disputes that arise under the agreement.”  United Steelworkers v. Am. 
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). In another case the Court explained: 
But the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the 
very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of 
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grievance machinery, including arbitration, under the collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) avoided the antagonism and bloodshed of company and worker 
confrontations.  The CBA was the basis for self-governance in the workplace.76  The 
Court’s regard for, and support of, labor arbitration engendered many of the 
contemporary doctrines of arbitration law, most of which were announced in the 
Steelworkers Trilogy77:  (1) the recourse to arbitration is based upon the parties’ 
contractual consent; (2) courts enforce arbitration agreements as they are written, i.e., 
pursuant to their terms; (3) courts decide threshold jurisdictional questions unless the 
parties clearly agree otherwise; (4) the parties bargain for arbitrator rulings—
therefore, merits review is generally excluded from the process of judicial 
supervision; and (5) given the utility and importance of arbitration, there is a 
presumption in favor of arbitrability.78  The decisional content of the Steelworker’s 
Trilogy became the model for the FAA’s regulation of arbitration.79 
                                                          
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems 
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord 
with the variant needs and desires of the parties . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the continuous 
collective bargaining process. 
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). Finally, 
the Court explained its support for arbitrators: 
[T]he arbitrators under these collective agreements are indispensable agencies in 
a continuous collective bargaining process.  They sit to settle disputes at the plant level 
– disputes that require for their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a 
particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in particular agreements. 
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).  See also, 
e.g., William B. Gould, IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards – Thirty Years of the 
Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T and Misco,  64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464 
(1989); Ann C. Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
631 (1990); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance 
Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78 (1991); Martin 
H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor 
and Employment Arbitration From the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187 
(1993). 
76In the Court’s view: “[t]he collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties of 
the parties.  It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases 
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate. . . . The collective [bargaining] agreement 
covers the whole employment relationship.” Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 578-79 
(citation omitted).   
77United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), form the Steelworkers Trilogy.  These three cases 
state the essence of the federal law of labor arbitration.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 
1, at 164.  The Trilogy also established arbitration as the principal method for resolving 
disputes between union and management arising from collective bargaining agreements.  Id.  
See also supra note 75. 
78AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-651 (1986) 
(summarizing the essential tenets of the judicial doctrine on labor arbitration). 
79Courts can scrutinize labor arbitration awards for public policy violations.  
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 304.  In United 
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The rules of labor arbitration not only affirmed arbitral autonomy, but also 
supplied guard rails to counteract possible arbitrator abuse of power.  CBA 
arbitration allowed judicial review of the merit of awards on the basis of arbitrator 
disregard of the agreed-upon contract—the CBA.80  Court supervision for manifest 
disregard of the law limited arbitrator decisional sovereignty.  Arbitrators could not 
simply dispense their own brand of industrial justice.  Their rulings needed to stay 
within the four corners of the collective bargaining agreement established by the 
union and management.81  In addition to claims based upon “manifest disregard of 
the law,” the grounds for showing “irrationality,” and the “public policy exception” 
were elaborated to prevent or counter the untoward use of decisional authority by 
arbitrators.82  Rogue arbitrators could not denature the foundational instrument in 
individual adjudications; determinations there had to reflect a basic commitment to 
essential, agreed-upon principles. 
Labor and commercial arbitration, however, were subject to different statutory 
regimes.  Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 established a 
preference for the arbitral resolution of labor disputes.83  Commercial arbitration, 
                                                          
Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the Court noted that 
the judicial authority to review arbitral awards arises from the right of courts to refuse to 
enforce immoral or illegal acts.  Id. at 42.  The Court adapted, however, the public policy 
exception to the federal policy on arbitration.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 305. The Court will only vacate a labor arbitration award 
when it violates public policy arising from laws and legal precedents, not simply from a 
diffuse sense of what might constitute public policy.  Id.  Therefore, the judicial supervision of 
labor arbitration awards conforms to the federal policy favoring arbitration.  Id. 
80A labor arbitration award must “draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement.”  Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.  If an arbitrator strays beyond 
the CBA, a court can vacate the award.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 171-72. See 
also, Jay E. Grenig, When Due Process is Due: The Courts and Labor Arbitration, 1995 DET. 
C.L. MICH. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 889 (1995); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 91 (2000). 
81CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 171-72. 
82See, e.g., Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies 
and Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 245 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988); Jeffrey Alan Goldenberg, Judicial Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards Reinstating Dangerous Employees, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 625 (1990); 
Gould, supra note 75; Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The 
Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 MO. L. REV. 243 (1987); Joan Parker, Judicial 
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Misco and Its Impact on the Public Policy Exception, 4 
LAB. LAW 683 (1988); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 235 (2006); William E. Smith, Judicial Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards in Rhode Island, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 165 (1998); and Elizabeth 
Tenorio, Comment, Modifying the Standard of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: 
A Comparison to Administrative Review Hearings, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 245 (1997). 
83The Court further explained “that § 301 enables the federal courts ‘to fashion a body of 
federal law for the enforcement of . . . collective bargaining agreements.’ . . . The legislation 
thereby expressed ‘a federal policy that federal courts should enforce. . . agreements [to 
arbitrate] on behalf of or against labor organization. . . .” CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND 
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along with employment and consumer arbitration, were governed by the FAA.84  
There was nonetheless a great deal of interface and borrowing between the two 
statutory frameworks in terms of decisional doctrines.  In fact, courts in labor 
arbitration rulings first recognized the need for arbitral autonomy and for a unitary 
national law of arbitration.85  There was a basic common denominator in the law of 
arbitration despite the sui generis character of these forms of arbitration.  
Distinguishing them progressively became a formalistic exercise.  Any prospective 
revision of the applicable statutory frameworks should attempt to create a single 
regime of governance for arbitration given the essential commonality of doctrine. 
VI.  THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSBORDER ARBITRATION 
A series of cases on international litigation and arbitration, which can be dubbed 
a trilogy in their own right, had a significant impact upon the contemporary 
development of arbitration law under the FAA.  In a number of significant respects, 
the Bremen,86 Scherk,87 Mitsubishi,88 (and Vimar)89 cases represented a pure policy 
                                                          
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 301 (citing Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451, 455 (1957)).  See also texts cited supra note 82. 
84Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act states that the Act does not apply to employment 
contract disputes.  NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 59.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20 (1991), was decided in disregard of the express statutory text and lead to the 
creation of the field of employment arbitration.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 28. 
85The Sixth Circuit explained: 
[T]he exclusionary clause of § 1 of the Arbitration Act should be narrowly construed 
to apply to employment contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of 
workers actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce in the 
same way that seamen and railroad workers are.  We believe this interpretation 
comports with the actual language of the statute and the apparent intent of the 
Congress which enacted it.  The meaning of the phrase ‘workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce’ is illustrated by the context in which it is used, particularly the 
two specific examples given, seamen and railroad employees, those being two classes 
of employees engaged in the movement of goods in commerce. 
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1995).  Thus, this narrow 
reading of FAA § 1, and the holding in Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, allowed employment contracts to 
be submitted to arbitration. 
86M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).  See Elizabeth Jackson, Recent 
Development, Civil Procedure: The Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses under M/S 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 377 (2001). 
87Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). See Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note, 
Will the Courts Scherk the Little Old Lady in Dubuque? The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver on the Individual Investor in a Global Securities Market, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129 
(1985). 
88Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  See, 
e.g., Charles H. Brower, II, Mitsubishi, Investor-State Arbitration, and the Law of State 
Immunity, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 907 (2005); Lisa M. Ferri, Note, International Arbitration-
Commerce-Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Arising from International Commercial Disputes 
Recognized Under Federal Arbitration Act – Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 448 (1987); Ronald E. M. 
Goodman, Note, Arbitrability and Antitrust: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655 (1985); Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decision, 
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play by the Court.  In effect, the Court took it upon itself to adapt the U.S. legal 
system to the exigencies of international (now global) commerce.90  It fulfilled its 
legislative design by exempting international transactions from the reach of domestic 
law, which supplied a purely internal form of regulation that often conflicted with 
                                                          
Federal Arbitration Act – Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards – Arbitrability of Antirust Claims Arising From an International Transaction, 80 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 168 (1986); Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior’s Case to Mitsubishi: The Future 
of Arbitration and Public Law, 477 PRAC. LAW INST./COMMERC. LAW & PRAC. COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 177 (1988); Lauri Newton, Comment, Arbitration and Antitrust: A Leg up 
for International Arbitration [Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrsyler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 
S. Ct. 3346 (1985)], 25 WASHBURN L.J. 536 (1986); Jill A. Pietrowski, Comments, Enforcing 
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements – Post-Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REV. 57 (1986); Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the 
Harmonization of International Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 
647 (1999); Lisa Sopata, Note, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.: 
International Arbitration and Antitrust Claims, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 595 (1986); Michael 
R. Voorhees, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims: 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 65 (1987); Tenth 
Circuit Refines Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Under Mitsubishi, 6 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REP. 110 (1995). 
89Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, Her Engines, 515 U.S. 528 
(1995).  See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Clark, Note & Comment, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and 
Foreign Forum Selection Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros Y 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1996 BYU L. REV. 483 (1996); Stuart C. Gauffreau, 
Note, Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: The Supreme Court’s Decision 
in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 395 
(1996); C. Christine Fahrenback, Note, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer: A 
Change in Course: COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime, 29 
AKRON L. REV. 371 (1996); Kimberly D. Gilbert, Case Comment, Conflicts of Law: 
Validating Foreign Arbitration Clause in Maritime Bill of Lading – Vimar Seguros Y 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 29 F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 1994), aff’d, 115 S. Ct. 2322 
(1995), 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 265 (1995); Cherie L. Lacour, The Enforceability of Foreign 
Arbitration Clauses Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act After Vimar Seguros Y 
Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127 (1996); Brandon L. 
Milhorn, Note, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer: Arbitration Clauses in Bills 
of Lading Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173 (1997); Mark 
S. Rubin, Note, The Validity of Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Bills of Lading Governed by 
COGSA: Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguors, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 499 
(1995).  See also PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). 
90The U.S. Supreme Court has never decided a case directly involving the New York 
Convention.  The U.S. ratification of the Convention in 1970 did inspire the Court to establish 
American rules of private international law, including those applying to international 
commercial arbitration.  CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra 
note 1, at 354-365.  See Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; Scherk, 417 U.S. 506; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614; 
Vimar, 515 U.S. 528.  See also, e.g., John R. Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims 
in International Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a 
World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 361 (1986); Daniel A. Losk, Note, Section 
1782(A) After Intel: Reconciling Policy Considerations and a Proposed Framework to Extend 
Judicial Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1035 (2005); 
Pietrowski, supra note 88; Practice and Perspective, 9 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 137 
(1998). 
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domestic schemes in other, implicated countries.  It achieved stability in the 
international marketplace by allowing international merchants to self-regulate 
through contract.  In the Court’s view, there was no other effective source of law at 
the transborder level.  National courts contributed to the international rule of law by 
enforcing contracts as written.  This subservience included enforcing arbitration 
agreements to which the parties had agreed.91 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s elaboration of the U.S. rules of private international 
law had a significant bearing upon the content and ultimate development of U.S. 
arbitration law.  The Court’s rulings recognized the special adjudicatory needs of 
international transactions and the utility of arbitration in satisfying these needs.  
Effective adjudication required dislodging national judicial jurisdiction, and effective 
adjudication was always better than elaborate but ineffective adjudication.  Also, the 
elevated stature of some of the affected rights did not preclude the reference to 
arbitration because a policy of preclusion would have undermined the rule of law.  
The Court concluded, therefore, that the FAA sustained the arbitrability of statutory 
claims in a transborder (and later in a domestic) context.92 
The Court’s endorsement of international commercial arbitration eventually 
coalesced with arbitration’s expanding domestic jurisdictional reach.  To promote its 
policy objectives, the Court soon forgot how unique it believed transborder processes 
were when it initially decided the international cases.  It simply integrated the 
international rule without any notice or fanfare into the domestic decisional law on 
arbitration.93  Unlimited subject-matter arbitrability thereby became a basic principle 
of U.S. arbitration law.94  In fact, unless the arbitration agreement itself provided 
expressly otherwise, a broad arbitration agreement established, as a matter of law, 
                                                                
91The Court explained: “[t]he threshold question is whether that court should have 
exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum 
clause.” Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.  The Court ruled in favor of enforcing the arbitration 
agreement stating that “[a] parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an 
international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite 
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation 
advantages.” Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.  This clearly evidenced the Court’s intent to favor 
the enforcement of contracts for international commercial arbitration. 
92The Court quoted Mitsubishi stating, “we are well past the time when judicial suspicion 
of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals should inhibit 
enforcement of the Act in controversies based on statutes.”  Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
93McMahon held that claims under the Exchange Act and RICO (Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act) were arbitrable.  McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; CARBONNEAU, 
NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 149.  The integration of international arbitral principles into U.S. 
law continued in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
94To differing degrees, Scherk and Mitsubishi held that international arbitrators could rule 
on statutory claims that arose in the context of international contracts.  Scherk focused more 
upon the enforcement of the arbitral clause.  CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 115.  
The Court eventually ignored the international character of these holdings, and converted the 
idea of statutory arbitrability into a general principle of U.S. arbitration law.  Id.  See, e.g., 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477. 
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that the parties had submitted both statutory and contractual claims to arbitration.95  
The principle of statutory arbitrability was incorporated into domestic law despite its 
origins in international commerce and the FAA’s deafening silence on the issue.  The 
U.S. law of arbitration became absolutely unitary, merging state and federal law as 
well as domestic and international doctrines on arbitration.  Moreover, as noted 
earlier,96 the core principles of labor arbitration were now embedded in the U.S. law 
of arbitration:  Freedom of contract prevailed including the contract-established duty 
to arbitrate; parties could remove the courts’ ability to decide jurisdictional 
challenges and delegate that power to arbitrators; and courts avoided trespassing into 
the domain of arbitration by engaging in limited and narrow supervision of arbitral 
agreements and awards.97 
VII.  THE NEW FORMS OF ARBITRATION 
As it developed its new mission, arbitration’s methodology of dispute resolution 
became conversant with nearly all civil disputes.  In the securities context, arbitration 
was no longer just an inside-the-business mechanism to resolve professional disputes 
between brokerages and exchanges.  Rather, it became an industry-wide dispute 
resolution process applying to employees and investors as well.98  In effect, in order 
to work in the business or to buy shares, individuals were obligated to agree to 
arbitrate their disputes.  Acquiescence to arbitration was the price of admission.  The 
public regulation of the financial marketplace was subordinated to the policy 
favoring arbitration. 
Employment arbitration also became well-established.99  The employment 
contract exception in FAA § 1 was narrowed to a small group of employees.100  The 
rule of statutory arbitrability even allowed civil rights claims that arose in the 
workplace to be decided by arbitration.101  Nonetheless, employment arbitration gave 
                                                                
95The author previously noted in his work: 
Therefore, a broad reference to arbitration (“any dispute arising under this contract”) 
encompasses—as a matter of law—contract problems relating to performance, 
delivery, consideration, conformity to specifications, excuse and other defenses, as 
well as statutory claims pertaining to the public regulation of commercial conduct 
(bankruptcy, antitrust, securities, and tax).  A broad reference to arbitration also 
encompasses civil rights claims.   
CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 16. 
96Steelworkers Trilogy, supra notes 77-79. 
97Id. 
98Arbitration has long been used to resolve disputes between brokers and stock exchanges.  
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 248.  Securities 
arbitration has now been extended to include disputes between customers and employees.  Id.  
See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 
U.S. 477. 
99See generally, THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 2d (JurisNet, LLC 
2006) (hereinafter CARBONNEAU, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION). 
100See supra note 85. 
101Claims involving rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are arbitrable.  
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 355.  The 
Court in Gardner-Denver allowed an employee access both to an arbitral and a judicial forum 
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rise to the most controversial issue in the field of arbitration, namely, whether 
adhesionary and unilateral agreements to arbitrate were legally enforceable 
contracts.102  At least for a vocal minority of courts, unconscionability became an 
effective barrier to arbitration in such employment circumstances.103  The challenge 
generated debate about the distribution of the costs in arbitration and the mutual 
character of the obligation to arbitrate.104  Dissenting views gave rise to a few 
safeguarding modifications, like the payment of all arbitral costs by the stronger 
party in some cases.105  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, did not share these 
reservations about the legitimacy of arbitration.106 
Arbitration also became a fixture in consumer transactions.107  Many of the 
fairness issues that surfaced in connection with employment arbitration also emerged 
                                                          
to resolve statutory claims, even though the CBA contained an anti-discrimination provision 
and a valid agreement to arbitrate.  Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).  
The Gilmer court, however, advanced a different rule more protective of arbitration than the 
vindication of legal rights.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).  
102The issue relating to the enforceability of unilateral adhesion contracts containing 
arbitration agreements was addressed in Harris.  The court in Harris found that such contracts 
were fully and unequivocally enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.  Harris v. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
103CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 308 nn. 
35–37. 
104CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 190–93 (discussing Green Tree Fin. Corp.–
Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 
(6th Cir. 2003); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001); 
Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Fuller v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe 
& Jack of Del., Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D. Colo. 2000)). 
105The court in Cole ruled that the payment of arbitral costs by the employer was essential 
to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.  105 F.3d 1465.  Forcing the employee to pay 
all or part of the arbitrator’s fee would constitute a de facto violation of the employee’s 
statutory rights.  Id.  This decision was followed by the ruling in Shankle, holding that 
arbitration agreements are void when the arbitral fees were cost prohibitive to the employee.  
163 F.3d 1230. 
106The Supreme Court stated that the fact that a consumer bears some of the costs of the 
arbitral process,  
[a]lone is plainly insufficient to render [the arbitration agreement] unenforceable. To 
invalidate the agreement would undermine the liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements and would conflict with this Court’s holdings [for example,] 
that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that Congress intended 
to preclude arbitration of the statutory claims at issue. Thus, a party seeking to 
invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be 
prohibitively expensive bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such 
costs. 
Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81 (citations omitted).  See also Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 
F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002); Bradford, 238 F.3d 549; Kevin C. Clark, The State of Arbitral Fees 
After Green Tree Financial: Uncertainty and Contradiction Demands Further Guidance from 
the Supreme Court, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 133 (2003). 
107See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000); Engalla v. Permanente Med. 
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in the decisional law on consumer arbitration.  Here, the issue of arbitrability 
centered upon the compromise of remedies, especially the consumer’s ability to 
engage in class action relief.108  Would a waiver of class action relief, impliedly or 
expressly, lead to the non-enforcement of arbitration agreements?  Many courts did 
not think so.109 
VIII.  ARBITRATOR SOVEREIGNTY 
The Court’s first step in fostering the autonomy of arbitration was to federalize 
the applicable law—the exclusive reference to the FAA for the applicable law made 
for a uniform law and a single set of applicable principles.  The second step in 
erecting the doctrine was to give arbitrators the greatest possible jurisdictional range 
and, consequently, to minimize the role of courts.  The decisional sovereignty of the 
arbitrator was achieved in three landmark opinions. It was introduced in First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,110 and firmly established in Howsam v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds,111 and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.112   
                                                          
Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 
2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).  
108The Court in Bazzle held that the decision whether an arbitration agreement permitted 
class action litigation resided with the arbitrator once the court determined that a valid contract 
of arbitration existed.  Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  The ruling in 
Strand provided that arbitration agreements prohibiting class action lawsuits were enforceable 
as long as the consumers’ substantive rights were not violated.  Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Assoc. ND, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005).  Other federal courts have also upheld waivers of 
class actions in arbitral agreements.  See, e.g., Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 
(C.D. Cal. 2006);  Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
109See supra note 108. 
110First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). See, e.g., Adriana Dulic, 
First Options of Chicago, Inc., v. Kaplan and The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77 (2002); Kevin Michael Flowers, Recent Developments: First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 801 (1997); Natasha Wyss, First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. 
L. REV. 351 (1997). 
111Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).  See, e.g., Megan E. Byrnett, 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 739 (2004); Robert 
S. Clemente & Karen Kupersmith, A Gateway – and Not a Dead End: The Six-Year Eligibility 
Rule and Howsam, 1 SEC. ARB. 281 (2003); Michael A. Gross, Pre-hearing Motions in the 
Post-Howsam Era, 1 SEC. ARB. 203 (2003); James Hughes, Applying the Eligibility Rule in 
Securities Arbitration: Resolving Circuit Court Conflict Regarding the Proper Role of 
Arbitrators and Courts, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 565 (2003); Daniel Q. Posin, Further Analysis of 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Pending Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 13 WORLD ARB. & 
MEDIATION REP. 195 (2002); William Parker Sanders, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.: 
The United States Supreme Court Decides that Arbitrators, Not the Courts, Determine 
Procedural Questions Under the NASD Code of Arbitration, 2 J. AM. ARB. 199 (2003); Peter 
J. Smith, IV, Investors Win: Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Makes Entering 
Arbitration Quicker, Easier, and Less Expensive, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 127 (2003); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Howsam, Humana and Bazzle: Recent Cases That May Affect Your 
Arbitration/ADR Practice, 21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 51 (2003).  
112Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).  See, e.g., Dana T. Blackmore, 
The Class Action Arbitration Dilemma–Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp.: Does the FAA 
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Although FAA § 3 provided for the judicial resolution of threshold jurisdictional 
questions, the Kaplan Court gave parties the contractual prerogative of delegating 
that authority to arbitrators.113  Moreover, once a court discovered that a contract of 
arbitration was involved, all other matters pertaining to the arbitration (but for the 
enforcement of the award) were decided by the arbitrators.114  The combined effect 
of Kaplan, Howsam, and Bazzle—assuming parties invoked their prerogative under 
Kaplan—was to relegate the judicial role in arbitration to the back-end of the 
process.  Courts, moreover, could review arbitral awards only on a minimal basis.115  
                                                          
Preclude Class Action Arbitration When the Agreement is Silent?, 2 J. AM. ARB. 19 (2003); 
Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitrability After Green Tree v. Bazzle: Is There Anything Left for the 
Courts?, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 697 (2004); Jonathan R. Bunch, To Be Announced: Silence from the 
United States Supreme Court and Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an Uncertain 
Future for Class-wide Arbitration, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 259 (2004); Erin Davies, Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597 (2005); Michael Oliver Eckard, 
The United States Supreme Court’s Indecision in Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle: 
A Class Act, 55 S.C. L. REV. 489 (2004); Matthew Eisler, Difficult, Duplicative and 
Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of Class Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 62 
BUS. LAW. 1059 (2007); Samuel Estreicher & Michael J. Puma, Arbitration and Class Actions 
After Bazzle, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 13 (2003); Robert Jason Herndon, Mistaken Interpretation: 
The American Arbitration Association, Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, and the 
Real State of Class-Action Arbitration in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2128 (2004); Alan 
S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update: Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle—
Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 BUS. LAW. 1265 (2004); Kevin M. 
Kennedy & Bethany Appleby, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: A New Day for Class 
Arbitrations?, 23 FRANCHISE L.J. 84 (2003); Greg Kilby, Leaving a Stone Unturned – The 
Unanswered Question from Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Does the Federal 
Arbitration Act Permit Classwide Arbitration?, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413 (2005); Alissa L. 
Klein, The Battle Over the Gateway: The United States Supreme Court Holds that an 
Arbitrator is to Decide Class Action Issue in Green Tree Financial v. Bazzle, 2 J. AM. ARB. 
347 (2003); Scott L. Nelson, Bazzle, Class Actions, and Arbitration: an Unfinished Story, 2 
SEC. ARB. 307 (2005); Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 (2004); Zack Zuroweste, Like a 
Skunk at a Lawn Party: The Bazzle Decision Hits Corporate America, 6 J. AM. ARB. 19 
(2007). 
113Without ever referring to the doctrine by name, the Court held that parties could 
contractually agree to delegate the authority to rule on jurisdictional challenges to the 
arbitrators. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942-43. See CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 2007, supra note 1, at 192. 
114The Court explained its passive role stating that “[g]iven these considerations, along 
with the arbitration contracts’ sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions 
committed to arbitration, this matter of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not 
the courts, to decide.”  Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453. 
115The author previously noted that: 
Under the FAA, a court is required to confirm an award ‘unless the award is vacated, 
modified, or corrected as prescribed in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.’  Section 10 
provides for the vacatur of awards on limited grounds (corruption, fraud, or undo 
means; evident partiality; procedural misconduct; or excess arbitral authority).  
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, supra note 
3, at 557-58 (citing Borop v. Toluca Pacific Secs. Corp., No. 97 C 4591, 1997 WL 790588 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1997)). See also, e.g., Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 882 F. Supp. 
1202 (1995); Remney v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994); Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin 
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Arbitrators, therefore, functioned with great freedom; they were essentially 
unfettered in reaching adjudicatory decisions.  The courts became passive actors in 
their interaction with arbitration essentially deferring to the arbitrator’s exercise of 
authority. 
IX.  THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FEDERAL POLICY ON ARBITRATION 
The Court’s elaboration of a “strong federal policy favoring arbitration”116 raises 
at least two sets of contradistinctive questions.  On the one hand:  What impact does 
the policy have on the legitimacy of society and the Bill of Rights?  Is resolving the 
so-called litigation crisis by denying access to courts equivalent to reducing the 
problems associated with criminal incarceration by increasing the use of the death 
penalty?  How can the Court declare unfair, unilateral contracts to be mutual 
bargains?  Is the policy on arbitration ultimately destructive of legality and the 
integrity of adjudication? 
On the other hand:  Is there a single version of public justice that must of 
necessity be fully implemented in every case? Are cumbersome, protracted, 
expensive, and fundamentally adversarial proceedings indispensable to the equation 
for justice?  Is it imperative that society provide its members with public courts of 
law?  Is functional and affordable adjudication not the only true justice?  Does the 
implementation of law trump its mythology? 
Even more pointedly:  Is the federal policy on arbitration analogous in some 
respects to “separate but equal”?  Does it reflect the use of legal doctrine to promote 
an unlawful circumstance—here, the elimination of the right to judicial recourse?  At 
the time of its pronouncement, “separate but equal” had the trappings of an ordinary 
legal doctrine.  It, however, concealed a pernicious objective.  It was designed to 
give racism a palatable look, to make it appear lawful.  Eventually, the Court and the 
rest of society understood that, in a racial context, separate was never equal and was 
never intended to be.  In a like manner, the Court’s endorsement and promotion of 
arbitration could be intended to mask an essential failing in society and to give a 
lawful appearance to an invidious design contrived by the Court and other powerful 
social actors.   
Suspicions are raised because some parts of the Court’s arbitration doctrine are 
based upon self-evident falsehoods—distortions accepted as truth only because the 
Court says they are true.117  Although the Court may argue otherwise, in fact, 
arbitration does not guarantee parties the same rights they have in court.  Arbitration 
                                                          
Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 
775 (11th Cir. 1993); Fine v. Bear, Stearns, & Co., 765 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
116See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); J. Alexander Secs., Inc. 
v. Mendez, 511 U.S. 1150 (1994); Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoreman’s 
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 708 (1982); Gateway Coal. Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 
U.S. 368, 382 (1974). 
117In overruling Wilko, Justice Kennedy asserted that “arbitration is merely a form of trial 
to be used in lieu of a trial at law.”  Rodriquez de Ouijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 
477, 480 (1989) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 433 (1960)). Additionally, in Rodriguez, 
the Court stated that: “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”  Id. at 481 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
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is designed to abbreviate judicial proceedings to reduce the cost of litigation and to 
make adjudication workable.  Arbitration provides for reasonable adjudication and 
rights protection; they are not those supplied by courts.  Despite the Court’s contrary 
proclamation, arbitration is not a mere form of trial that has no impact upon 
substantive rights.118  The handshake in arbitration differs from the one in court.  The 
only means of providing equivalent rights is to judicialize arbitration which then robs 
arbitration of many of its procedural advantages.  The circularity of the reasoning 
would then be complete. 
The ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson119 was designed to implement a hate principle. A 
hate principle, however, does not appear to be at work in the federal policy on 
arbitration.  There seems to have been an ill-defined floating desperation within the 
Court over the years to find some sort of solution to the problem in American society 
of access to justice.  In a haphazard manner, that objective, in various forms, 
circumstances, and intensities, was given expression in litigation on the FAA.  These 
encounters (like the emergence of life itself on the planet) eventually gave rise to a 
complete and viably shaped legal doctrine, the momentum of which has yet to 
subside.  A conspiracy among highly placed institutional actors for nearly half a 
century is not as convincing as the explanation that a set of piecemeal adjustments 
eventually acquired its own raison d’etre and a sufficient allegiance among the 
Court’s shifting membership.  This speculation, however, is belied by Judge 
Medina’s prophetic insights in Robert Lawrence.120 
At worse, the consequences of the federal policy on arbitration—whether 
deliberately or innocently—may affect weaker social actors disproportionately.  
Employees and consumers may lose rights only available in court or have them 
abridged or compromised.  Do weaker citizens, however, really bear this cost alone?  
If so, is the unfairness warranted because everyone benefits from a more efficient 
and economical society?  In the end, although the Court aspired only to influence the 
social role and standing of adjudication, the judicial doctrine on arbitration may 
represent a policy preference in favor of capitalism and economic prosperity over all 
other social values and objectives.  Arbitration may have discounted litigation and 
put it on “sale.”  The economies would be an unintended, albeit necessary, benefit of 
the Court’s program to make adjudication more accessible. 
“Suborning” capitalism is hardly a crime.  In fact, it is—in all likelihood—a 
social good that provides society-wide prosperity.  Through statements of legal 
doctrine on arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court was trying to make the Bill of Rights 
work and remain relevant in American society.  The arbitral barrier to judicial 
adjudication applies equally to all contracting parties and does not discriminate 
between them or provide “other” processes for some of them.  Reducing the cost of 
adjudication and providing better access to everyone, as well as quicker binding 
                                                                
118See CARBONNEAU, NUTSHELL, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938; Howsam, 
537 U.S. 79; Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444).  
119Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
120Justice Medina wrote, “[w]e think it is reasonably clear that the Congress intended by 
the Arbitration Act to create a new body of federal substantive law affecting the validity and 
interpretation of arbitration agreements. . .” Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 
271 F. 2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959).   
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finality, cannot be described as a social evil.  A social necessity in civilized society 
would be a more apposite and accurate description. 
X.  EVALUATING THE FEDERAL POLICY   
The U.S. Supreme Court’s policy on arbitration has been elaborated through 
some forty opinions over forty years.121  The policy is not overtly, or even impliedly, 
a configuration of judicial doctrine motivated by political ideology.  It spans many 
different tilts to the Court’s composition and its many different personalities.  In 
recent times, Breyer and Ginsburg have authored as many opinions as Stevens, 
Kennedy, or the late Chief Justice.  Justice Douglas appears to have been the most 
ardent High Court opponent to arbitration, but on the basis of preserving the integrity 
of law and institutional relationships.122  There was no “penumbra” to his assessment 
                                                                
121See, e.g., Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. ____ (2008) (holding 
that the statutory grounds for the vacatur of awards are exclusive);  Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. 
Ct. 978 (2008) (affirming the Court’s previous decision in Buckeye Check Cashing); Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 
U.S. 52 (2003); PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 
(2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp. – Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Wright v. Universal 
Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998); Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. 
v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); U.S. Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 
(1993); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Ca., 480 U.S. 102 
(1987); United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987); 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver CO., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. 
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Berndardt v. 
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); and Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
122Justice Douglas explained his opposition to arbitration stating that: 
An arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons and without 
development of a record, so that the arbitrator’s conception of our statutory 
requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet functionally unreviewable, even when the 
arbitrator seeks to apply our law. We recognized in Wilko that there is no judicial 
review corresponding to review of court decisions. The extensive pretrial discovery 
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for actions in district court would 
not be available. And the wide choice of venue provided by the 1934 Act, [] would be 
forfeited. The loss of the proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial 
rights. 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).  
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of arbitration and its inferiority to judicial litigation.123  The only real challenge to the 
current policy came in Volt Information Sciences124 in which the views of would-be 
conservative Justices, antithetical to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, 
prevailed over a would-be liberal dissent to maintain the favorable judicial policy 
intact.  Finally, an admittedly conservative justice—Justice Thomas—has been the 
most vociferous critic of federal preemption and expanding the reach of the FAA to 
state courts.125  Both are essential to the strong federal policy in favor arbitration.   
Politics and ideology do not seem to inform the Court’s decisional law on 
arbitration.  Neither quiet moneyed interests nor vocal special interest groups have 
imposed an agenda on, or influenced, the Court.  The policy favoring arbitration 
appears to be a purely judicial policy, instituted to achieve the ends of the legal 
system.  Some of the most powerful lawyers in American society admitted that the 
judicial process had failed in some significant respects.  In a politically contentious 
                                                          
Justice Black noted:  
And I am fully satisfied that a reasonable and fair reading of that Act’s language and 
history shows that both Congress and the framers of the Act were at great pains to 
emphasize that nonlawyers designated to adjust and arbitrate factual controversies 
arising out of valid contracts would not trespass upon the courts’ prerogative to decide 
the legal question of whether any legal contract exists upon which to base an 
arbitration. 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Food & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407-408 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
123Prima Paint, 388 U.S. 395. Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined in dissent, 
stated: “[i]t seems to be what the Court thinks would promote the policy of arbitration. I am 
completely unable to agree to this new version of the Arbitration Act, a version which its own 
creator in Robert Lawrence practically admitted was judicial legislation.” Id. at 425 (emphasis 
added). 
124Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Tr. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). See, 
e.g., Howard W. Ashcraft, Jr., Volt v. Board of Trustees: Construction Arbitration and the 
Making of a Federal Case, 8 CONSTRUCTION LAW 1 (1988); Arthur S. Feldman, Note, Volt 
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University: 
Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69 TEX. L. REV. 691 (1991); An 
Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 2250 (2002). 
125Justice Thomas continued his opposition to arbitration stating that: 
In short, we have never actually held, as opposed to stating or implying in dicta, that 
the FAA requires a state court to stay lawsuits brought in violation of an arbitration 
agreement covered by § 2.  
 Because I believe that the FAA imposes no such obligations on state courts, and 
indeed that the statute is wholly inapplicable in those courts, I would affirm the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s judgment.  
Allied-Bruce Terminex, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 297 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
Justice Thomas dissented again in Mastrobuono stating: 
[W]e concluded that the Act “simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated 
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” As a 
result, we interpreted the choice-of-law clause “to make applicable state rules 
governing the conduct of arbitration” even if a specific rule itself hampers or delays 
arbitration.   
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 65 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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world in which resource allocation was very problematic, they set about finding a 
non-tax-supported solution to the provision of adjudicatory services in society.  The 
Court found its solution in arbitration.  
The Court appears to have been motivated exclusively by a desire to fulfill its 
responsibility to the rule of law—to the provision of effective legal and juridical 
services in American society.  The judicial policy responded to a variety of needs in 
society.  Functional adjudication evidently advances business interests.  It is 
indisputable that business interests find aspects of the current legal process 
frustrating, unfair, and counterproductive—amounting to a type of invisible tax on 
commercial activity.  These aspects include class action litigation, the attribution of 
punitive damages, jury determinations, and the use of the litigation process to force 
or “extract” settlements.126  It is equally uncontestable that law is necessary to the 
proper operation of the marketplace.  The order, predictability, and stability that 
result from a functional legal process make commercial transactions, profit, 
employment, and development possible.  The rule of law is also instrumental to an 
individual’s rights and personal allegiance to society.  There is no other solution to 
irreconcilable conflict than even-handed justice.  History makes it clear that the right 
to redress grievances is instrumental to social civilization.127  The goal of 
contemporary democratic society is to preserve individual rights, achieve economic 
prosperity, and allow for orderly transitions in political power.  This is the enterprise 
that the Court is attempting to sustain by replacing judicial litigation with arbitral 
adjudication in civil disputes and essentially relegating court proceedings to criminal 
prosecutions that directly affect individual civil liberties or to cases that involve 
highly divisive social issues. 
The only real flaw in the decisional edifice is the issue of how the obligation to 
arbitrate is contracted.  Coercive recourse by the weaker party contravenes 
traditional American notions of fairness.  The weakness in the Court’s policy is that 
few people would voluntary surrender the publicly known (the courts) for the 
                                                                
126Corporate managers assess litigation in terms of its monetary costs and impact upon 
company time and resources.  Generally, it is better to deal with would-be nuisance or 
potentially catastrophic litigation as economically as possible.  Judicial litigation also exposes 
companies to potentially limitless liability.  Juries, especially in the state of Mississippi, favor 
the “underdog” plaintiff against established interests.  See generally Rand Institute For Civil 
Justice, Juries and Verdicts, http://www.rand.org/icj/pubs/juries.html.  For complete books and 
articles on Juries, see http://www.questia.com/library/law/juries.jsp.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
itself disfavors punitive damages, perceiving them as an insufficient instrument of regulation.  
See Supreme Court Cases and Decisions, Philip Morris v. Williams, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/washington/scctuscases_PUNITIVEDAMAGES.HTML; Justices 
to Examine Punitive Damages in Exxon Oil Spill, WASHINGTON POST, http://www.Washington 
post.com/up-dyn/content/article/2007/10/29/AR2007102900779.html; Bob Egelko, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, In 5-4 ruling, Supreme Court curbs punitive damages (Feb. 21, 2007), 
http://www.SFGate.com/cgi-bin/article.  See also THOMAS J. COLLIN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND 
BUSINESS TORTS:  A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK (1998). 
127Japan is something of an exception in that social hierarchy and political bureaucracy are 
the primary forces of society, but law remains at least relatively significant.  Hitler, and now 
Chavez, are the only two recent examples of the perversion of the rule of law by manipulating 
the process of democracy to establish duly-elected dictatorships.  Chavez, however, was 
unable to persuade the Venezuelan electorate.  A few Roman emperors might also qualify for 
this dubious accolade. 
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privately unknown (arbitration).  The problem is apparent in employment and 
consumer arbitration, fields that have generated the most strident anti-arbitration 
litigation.128  In articulating its policy, the Court was faced with a dilemma of 
allowing for contract freedom in the recourse to arbitration or indirectly mandating 
arbitration.  Full contract freedom meant most employees and consumers would 
choose to trust the courts (or, at least, take a long time to adjust to the new remedy), 
thereby defeating the policy imperative of providing society-wide access to workable 
justice.  Fostering arbitration, therefore, meant abridging individual contract rights 
and coercing participation in the process.  The economically superior actor would 
impose the agreement to arbitrate in an industry-wide fashion.  Therefore, freedom 
of contract alone could not bring about the revolution; abridgement of individual 
rights became an administrative imperative to establishing the policy on arbitration. 
The Court enforced adhesion contracts as if they were bilateral contracts.129  
Undemocratic and possibly overreaching, the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration was made acceptable by proclaiming that the contract of arbitration, even 
though the product of a single party, was—as a matter of law—equally in each 
party’s best interest.130  Institutional actors avoided the negative aspects of judicial 
adjudication, especially its disruptive effect upon transactions and commercial 
policy.  Individual parties gained access to a viable form of adjudication that 
provided workable remedies and basic fairness.  Arbitral adjudication also had an 
extensive track record of adaptability to new circumstances.131  It, therefore, could be 
adjusted to repair identified deficiencies and address new eventualities.  Arbitration 
was for both parties, fair, flexible, and final—in addition to being effective, efficient, 
and expert. 
XI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Arbitrators can provide legal, equitable, professional, and customary answers to 
conflicts.  Adaptability, expertise, and eventual finality are the principal 
characteristics of arbitration.  Lawyers provide the hands-on supervision as counsel 
and advocates, while courts peer remotely into the process from a respectful 
distance.  Disadvantages exist but have not persuaded the policy-makers from their 
endorsement of arbitration.  Law—in the sense of decisional law or stare decisis—
suffers because legal norms are no longer elaborated on a public record.132  Awards 
are private rulings not always accompanied by decisional reasoning.  The decisional 
sovereignty of the arbitrator is sometimes close to a divine right.  Arbitrators decide 
procedure, the merits, and damages almost without constraint.  They can rule on 
contract and regulatory law claims.  There is little, if any, protection from the 
                                                                
128See generally CARBONNEAU, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 99. 
129See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).  
130Carbonneau, Crossroads of Legitimacy, supra note 64.  
131Id. 
132One of the standard criticisms of arbitration is that there is no public discussion of the 
legal norms it creates.  It is true that arbitral proceedings are private; however, the publication 
of awards is beginning and is quite strong.  In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled these 
concerns insufficient to invalidate an arbitration agreement.   See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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ignorance, incompetence, or mistakes of arbitrators.  The protection of rights 
succumbs to expediency and functionality and the risks of an unaccountable process.   
These disadvantages can either be remedied or tolerated.  A less malleable 
problem is that arbitral justice was never the promise of the American Constitution.  
Judicial justice was or, at least, became the general expectation.  Despite this 
reverence, having law arrive at bad or no results is difficult to defend.  It amounts to 
creating a bundle of abstract legal guarantees with no consequence upon the reality 
of society.  It is an empty sociological mythology.  An elevated and sacrosanct 
promise of due process is meaningless if it cannot be implemented.  In these 
circumstances, the purity of due process guarantees should yield to arbitration’s 
flexibility, fairness, and finality because the latter, unlike the former, has a 
measurable positive bearing upon the lives of individuals.  In this sense, arbitration 
and privatized justice save the promise of the law from itself and its failure of 
implementation.  Arbitration is truncated adjudication, but—despite, or perhaps 
because of, an absence of discovery, cross-examination, and appeal—it produces real 
and sustainable adjudicatory results. 
There remains a gnawing reluctance to accept fully and unquestioningly the 
Court’s transformation of justice through arbitration.  As noted earlier,133 the 
hesitancy arises in part from the adhesionary character of some arbitration 
agreements.  Doubts also arise from the ability of arbitrators to decide public law 
issues in private proceedings.134  Arbitrators can rule upon the great issues of the 
day—racial discrimination, gender equality, the integrity of financial markets, and 
monopolistic commercial conduct—and, yet, have no public mandate or allegiance 
to the public interest.  The very development of statutory law is stunted by such a 
process. 
Modifications in the arbitral mechanism could protect the integrity of law.  For 
example, recent rulings on labor arbitration teach that consent to the arbitrability of 
statutory rights must be individually affirmed.135  The same rule could be applied to 
adhesion contracts to engage in employment arbitration.  Employees would need to 
sign a special notice that explains the significance of arbitration and its impact upon 
statutory rights.  This requirement would need to proceed from federal law—as an 
amendment to, interpretation of, or revision of the FAA—because if it were imposed 
by state contract law it could be subject to federal preemption as a rule that 
discriminates against contracts of arbitration.136  A similar practice could be 
implemented for consumer contracts that contain arbitral clauses.  These new forms 
of arbitration might warrant special rules of validity under the FAA.  It should be 
underscored that the affirmance regime would not allow employees or consumers to 
reject the unilateral agreement to arbitration disputes.  It simply provides for the 
conveyance of greater information and knowledge.  The weaker party at least enters 
the imposed process with an enhanced sense of what it involves.  Parties should 
know what arbitration means, the importance of arbitrator selection, and the 
process’s potential impact on procedural and substantive rights.   
                                                                
133See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
134The Court in Gilmer disposed of these fears.  Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20. 
135See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
136See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
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When employment and consumer transactions involve the application of statutory 
rights, courts should be authorized to review the arbitrator’s disposition of regulatory 
law matters.  The review that is contemplated would lead to the increased use of the 
common law grounds under FAA § 10, perhaps their express incorporation into 
statutory language.  As labor arbitrators cannot exceed the terms of the CBA, 
employment and consumer arbitrators should stay within the four corners of the 
applicable statute, as defined by flexible judicial standards.  The FAA might also 
require arbitrators to render reasons explaining their statutory determinations.  
Otherwise, the power to review would be meaningless.  Review could only be used 
to correct flagrant errors that denature the statute, that, in effect, eliminate the 
enacted rights.  Each of the new areas of arbitration should develop self-sustaining 
processes that conform to standards of fundamental fairness.  The danger is exposing 
the FAA to possibly a virulent virus of differing opinions.  In any event, the 
contemplated review might best be accomplished by an internal form of arbitral 
appeal to a second arbitral tribunal. 
Regulation could also take place in terms of mandating educational requirements 
for arbitrators and having them satisfy certifying obligations.  This would involve:  
instructional courses; a national examination, training, and experience; development 
of arbitrator dossiers; and the rule of impartial arbitrators.  Regulation must, 
however, be modest and contained.  It should apply only to necessary and abusive 
circumstances.  The act of regulating can easily get out of hand.  It should not 
transform or swallow up the process being regulated.  Intelligence and good 
judgment should accompany the elaboration of any public restrictions on the 
individual freedom to contract.  None of these modifications, however, are free of 
risks and dangers.  They may do more to compromise the arbitral process than to 
strengthen and embellish it. 
The most perceptive and reassuring recent development in the decisional law on 
arbitration came in the form of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in B.L. Harbert.137  
Rather than muddy the waters with more doctrinal sophistry, the court stated—
eloquently, forcefully, and persuasively—that pro forma litigious challenges to the 
enforceability of arbitral awards were antithetical to the process and society’s interest 
in workable adjudication.  In the court’s assessment, the claim that the arbitrator 
“manifestly disregarded the law” in reaching his determination was transparently 
false.  Like many other motions in a trial, the argument was pleaded by counsel in 
order to create delay and to obfuscate in the hope of reducing or with the more far-
fetched aspiration of eliminating the established liability.  According to the court, the 
arbitrator was a distinguished professional, had conducted a serious arbitration, and 
rendered a considered outcome.  The words and the instinct, however, were there.  
On a lucky day, they might speak to the court.  In adversarial litigation, as in “shout” 
journalism, advocates never leave any stone unturned; when all else fails, as the 
truism goes, they hurl insults.  In these fields of endeavor, there is no accountability 
for disfiguring the truth.  As long as pain is inflicted, the cause is advanced. 
                                                                
137B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006).  See 
Curtis Brown, Resolving Disputes Outside of Court, The Year in ADR Case Law, 17 
EXPERIENCE 19 (2007); Carbonneau, Crossroads of Legitimacy, supra note 64; Helm, supra 
note 64; Christopher McKinney, Too Many Motions for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration 
Awards?  The Eleventh Circuit Sanctions Unwary Litigants, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 283 (2007). 
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The Eleventh Circuit heard the words, but only recognized them for what they 
were.  Gaming arbitration like other matters in litigation, said the court, would 
destroy the beneficial impact of arbitration upon the adjudication of disputes.  
Adding adversarial tactics to the legal system’s regulation of arbitration would divest 
the alternative remedy of its efficiency and effectiveness.  Its principal effect would 
be to deprive society of a functional system of adjudication.  In the instant case, there 
was no factual justification whatsoever for the challenge to the arbitral award.  It was 
brought forward as a token, empty defense.  In the court’s view, the vacatur action 
was frivolous.  In a similar subsequent case, it would warrant the imposition of 
sanctions.  Involvement in legal proceedings does not justify an abuse of right. 
While a new statutory text reflecting case law additions would represent a 
measurable advance in the field of arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in B.L. 
Harbert is no less important.  In fact, such rulings may be the only antidote to the 
consequences of the political inability to enact a more contemporary statute. The 
clever ruse of the advocate or formalistic procedural maneuvering should not prevent 
the courts from reaching the right results.  Although the legal process exists to 
protect rights, that mission cannot be pursued at the price of obliterating the process 
itself.  Like freedom of speech, legal representation is both a right and responsibility.  
There is no license to exploit it without regard to its actual consequences upon 
individuals and society.  Analytically unsound positions and spurious allegations 
should not be allowed to pollute the process in the name of a vacuous concept of 
fairness.  Being fair does not mandate constitutional insanity. 
In many respects, arbitration represents a second chance for the legal system.  It 
amounts to a bypass that gives the legal system another opportunity at a healthy and 
productive social role.  The hope generated by arbitration and the judicial doctrine 
that protects it should not be muted by the antics of blind advocacy and reactive 
rights protection.  B.L. Harbert states a correct and essential position.  May it have a 
long and ample progeny. 
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